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Abstract
This study combines the leading theories and test them over a given sample of initial public offerings to see
how influential non-fundamental factors are on the IPO price and how the characteristics of the IPO change
the magnitude of signaling effects on the IPO price.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
All firms need to raise capital at one time or
another to finance new projects, expand operations,
or in many cases, just to start up their business.  One
of the best ways that newer and less established com-
panies have found to raise quick capital is to make
a stock offering.  Initial public offerings (IPOs) have
historically had very large initial first day gains com-
pared to the performance of the rest of the market.
If we assume that the market price of the stock, dic-
tated by supply and demand, is representative of the
company’s value, then the large gain reflects the fact
that the IPO issuing price agreed upon by the un-
derwriter and the firm making the offer is under the
actual value of the firm.  Historically, IPOs were
underpriced by roughly 16% according to an in-
dustry expert at Stein, Roe & Fonham.  However,
in recent months, some IPOs have seen first day run-
ups of as much as 200 to 400 percent, and the trend
for the future is likely to increase.  Loughran and
Ritter studied IPO issues from 1990 through 1998.
With more than three thousand initial public offer-
ings during that period, the average gain in the first
day of trading was 14.1%,  though returns varied
somewhat with the performance of the market.
However, so far in 1999 more than 43% of all IPOs
saw first day gains soar past 100%; only 3.7% of
IPOs did so in 1998 (Barker, 1999).  This study
will break down the various demand components
that have lead to the growing initial gains from IPOs.
Differences between the IPO offering price
and the first day closing price occur too often and
are, on average, too large to be explained away by
error in auditing practices.  If this were the case,
then an  auditing firm or investment bank would
also error on the side of overpricing the stock.  Vari-
ous theories have come to the forefront of this IPO
underpricing debate, most of them explaining the
pricing of a company’s stock in an IPO in terms of
signaling effects as opposed to the fundamental char-
acteristics of the firm and why a risk averse invest-
ment bank would be more likely to underprice a
stock issue.   The purpose of this study is to com-
bine the leading theories and test them over a given
sample of initial public offerings to see how influ-
ential non-fundamental factors are on the IPO price
and how the characteristics of the IPO change the
magnitude of signaling effects on the IPO price.
II.  BACKGROUND
While skyrocketing first day prices seem to
impress a large portion of the general public as well
as the media, there are those in the investment com-
munity who view this price discrepancy as a major
flaw in the auditing process of the investment bank
(Stapelton).  After all, the investment bank is work-
ing as an agent for the issuing firm.  Any price move-
ment upwards from the IPO price (minus floatation
fees) is precious money left on the table by the issu-
ing firm that will be needed someday.  Ideally, stock
prices should match the per share present value of
the discounted future earnings of the company, theo-
retically paid out as dividends.  This speculation of
the future is based on the fundamentals of the com-
pany and its industry’s anticipated growth.  Also
affecting investors’ perceptions of the future earn-
ings of a company are general market conditions
and expectations of macroeconomic factors such as
interest rates.  The prevailing price decided by these
combined factors does not spontaneously change the
minute the stock begins trading.  Various theories
explain why IPO contracts are not decided on with
prices equaling firm value per share minus floata-
tion fees.
While some companies do become very suc-
cessful before offering shares to the public, few are
able to compete in the marketplace without the ini-
tial inflow of capital that a stock offering provides.
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Consequently, many firms make IPOs before they
have any basis on which investors can judge them.
They have no past revenue records to look at and
many have yet to turn a profit before their stock is
trading on the exchanges.  This is especially true in
today’s rapidly emerging sectors such as the Internet
and technology sectors, where investors do not even
have the luxury of looking to the past performance
of the industry or finding information about the
quality and real value of the firm.  There exists huge
informational asymmetries in the IPO markets, and
various economic theories about such markets still
argue over who does and does not have the correct
information regarding the value of a firm (Weiss,
1988).  I hypothesize that IPO pricing in newer in-
dustries will be more subject to non-fundamental
factors and signaling effects than more seasoned in-
dustries with a longer, more informative history.
There are many entities involved when dis-
cussing an initial public offering. Each player in this
IPO arena has its own agenda and acts rationally
toward its own financial gain. The firm making the
offering, the investment bank, the auditing firm
(which will be regarded as part of the investment
bank’s services in this study), and the investors all
interact in the process of bringing an initial public
offering to the market.  According to past research
on this topic, the pricing of a company’s stock in
the IPO is greatly dependent on which of these enti-
ties possess perfect information about the issuing
firm, and which entities must rely on the others to
report the information to them.  The latter must rely
on signaling to infer the true value of a stock and
must give the more informed entities incentive to
provided accurate data about the firm’s true value.
Through these two mechanisms, the IPO price is
agreed upon and it may or may not reflect the ac-
tual worth of the company.
Unfortunately, in today’s financial world,
investment banks stand blocking the path to the capi-
tal markets.  The reason for this is that the firm would
incur crippling costs if it attempted to float a stock
offer on its own.  To sell the stock, the firm would
have to discount the price on each share far below
its actual value for liquidity and risk premiums that
the investors would face.  The investment bank is
strategically positioned to take advantage of the
economies of scale in their business and bring com-
panies’ stock to the markets with exposure that cur-
rently cannot be duplicated by individual firms with-
out substantial expense.  Although the Internet does
offer some potential alternative methods of selling
stock, these technologies are in their infancy and it
will be years before they can make a serious impact
on the investment banking business.
When a company uses an investment bank
to float an issue of shares, they have two choices in
terms of contracts with the investment bank.  The
company can choose to have the investment bank
make a best effort offering, in which case the in-
vestment bank would simply sell as many shares as
it could for the company and then take a percentage
of the proceeds, or the issuing firm can opt for the
investment bank to underwrite the issue.  In an un-
derwriting contract, the investment bank will buy
all of the issued shares from the company for a set
price and then make the offering to investors at the
IPO price that is made public.   It is easy to see how
this second choice of contract brings a great deal
more of risk to the investment bank.  It is the under-
writing contracts that this study will focus on as they
present the investment bank and the issuing firm
with a very unique set of considerations for setting
the IPO price.
III.  THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The first theory of IPO underpricing con-
sidered in this study is the Adverse Selection Theory.
This model, developed in a study by Rock in 1986,
divides the investors into two different groups, in-
formed and uninformed (Eisenbeis, McEnally,
1995).  According to Rock, the informed investors
know the true value of the stock and uninformed
investors invest randomly without any knowledge
of the company.  He also assumes that the invest-
ment bank has perfect knowledge of the issuing
firm’s real value and the issuing firm must rely on
the investment bank’s audit for this information.
This overly simplistic model, while unrealistic, does
give way to some interesting insights.
 Since the supply of a company’s common
stock is held constant, the price fluctuates by changes
in the demand for the stock.  Here, demand is sepa-
rated into two categories: informed investor demand
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and uninformed investor demand.   If companies
had IPO prices that reflected their true value then,
by the law of large numbers, the uninformed inves-
tors would either break even or lose money because
the informed investors would only invest in the
“good” IPOs, crowding out the uninformed inves-
tors, and be the only ones turning profits.  If this
were the case, uninformed investors would choose
not to participate in the IPO market, thereby cut-
ting the demand for stock in IPOs.  This drop in
demand for IPOs would leave less promising issu-
ing firms with undersubscribed IPOs.
Complicating this problem is the fact that
investment banks participate in share rationing of
very promising IPOs to preferred customers.  United
States law, unlike most other countries, allows the
investment banks to strategically allocate shares of
oversubscribed issues, usually completely crowd-
ing out uninformed investors (Eisenbeis, McEnally,
1995).  If these less informed investors had a better
chance of obtaining shares of these high value IPOs,
less underpricing would be necessary to keep their
demand for IPOs in the market.
To compensate for this, Rock claims that
companies intentionally underprice IPOs as a ra-
tional behavior in order to induce the uninformed
investors to participate in the market and thereby
raising the demand for the issues.  For companies
that are of very high value it is less necessary for
them to underprice their issue because of the large
demand for the stock by informed investors.  This
would explain the large first day run-ups in IPO
prices for technology and Internet stocks.  Typically,
these stock offerings are too small to be of any in-
terest to large, institutional investors, and this, to-
gether with the fact that there is little historical in-
formation to judge these companies, put them into
the pool of companies that must underprice their
issues in order to raise demand.  Hence, Rock’s ba-
sic pricing mechanism would dictate that the stock
underpricing should vary directly with uncertainty
about a company and  vary indirectly with the true
value of the issuing firm.  To test for this effect,
variables measuring the size of the company will
be entered into the empirical model to test for un-
certainty.  These variables will also serve to repre-
sent fundamental valuations of the issuing firm.
The second theory of underpricing exam-
ines the relationship between the investment bank
and the issuing firm.  The Principal-Agent Theory
used by Baron in a 1982 study yielded the Hazard
Model of Underpricing (Eisenbeis, McEnally,
1995).  In this model, it is assumed that the issuing
firm does not know its own true value and must
rely on the auditing of outside companies and the
investment bank to report accurate information.  The
issuing firm and investment bank agree to an IPO
contract based on the report that the investment bank
gives the issuing firm concerning its value.
This contract must satisfy several conditions
imposed by each entity.  First, the contract price must
meet certain minimal levels of expected returns to
the investment bank.  Secondly, the price of the IPO
must be low enough to induce the investment bank,
the agent in this scenario, to act in the issuing firm’s
best interest.  In other words, the issuing firm leaves
some money on the table for the investment bank in
order to insure that they (the agent) disclose all in-
formation about the firm and act in the firm’s best
interest.  The level of uncertainty the issuer faces
with respect to the investment bank’s reported in-
formation is positively related to underpricing.  Un-
derpricing therefore can reduce the costs of assur-
ing truthful advice from the banker.  This reveals
the same correlation that Rock found with small,
unestablished firms and underpricing.  If a firm is
in a situation of uncertainty, chances are it does not
have the same resources to conduct proper internal
audits as a larger, higher value firm.
Just as in the former model given by Rock,
Baron’s model can also be criticized as being overly
simplistic.  It does not take into account competi-
tion in the investment banking business which would
automatically ensure a certain amount of agent loy-
alty.  This model also does not take into consider-
ation the fact that the investment bank would be
worried about supporting its own reputation and
therefore have additional incentive to produce truth-
ful information about the firm’s value.  However, it
does clearly define an inverse relationship between
the real value of a firm and the degree of underpric-
ing.
The testable hypothesis in this model is that
the uncertainty that the issuer faces with respect to
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the bank’s information will be reflected in the ini-
tial first day returns of the IPO.  This study will
attempt to measure this effect by using  investment
bank reputation as a proxy for uncertainty from the
issuing firm’s point of view in addition to the issu-
ing firm size variable measuring real value.  This
assumes that as the size and reputation of the in-
vestment bank increases, their incentive for keep-
ing their reputation also increases so they will be
more motivated to produce truthful information.
Therefore, as reputation increases, the uncertainty
of the information provided by the investment bank
and IPO underpricing should go down.
 The next theories all focus on the effects of
signaling on an IPO’s price.  This compilation of
theories and mechanisms is probably the most real-
istic and comprehensive theory of IPO underpric-
ing.  These theories start from the assumption that
the firm issuing stock has perfect information about
its own value and that the investors are the unin-
formed entities.  The investors then value the com-
pany as a function of several different signaling
mechanisms.
 In a study by Leland and Pyle in 1977, the
conclusion was that the firm could signal its value
to outsiders by retaining its own shares (Eisenbeis,
McEnally, 1995).  The percentage of shares retained
by the original owners and insiders would logically
signal high value. The only reason that these people
would choose to hold onto shares would be to sell
them later in more seasoned offerings by the com-
pany at a higher price.  Conversely, if the firm’s
value was low then presumably in this model the
insiders in the firm would know this and choose to
sell as many shares as possible to acquire the start
up capital before the firm’s real, lower value be-
comes evident in the lower market price.
When the retention of shares is high, another
effect, also contributing to underpricing, is evident.
The theory here stems from general opinion in the
finance industry rather than from an empirical study.
The hypothesis asserts that firms will intentionally
underprice their issues specifically for the attention
gained by the large first day run-up in the stock price.
This gives the firm added publicity and media ex-
posure while simultaneously proving the firm’s
value to investors.  This technique is referred to as
grandstanding an IPO and would also be more fre-
quently employed by smaller, less established firms
who need to draw investor attention and whose value
is considered very uncertain by potential investors
(IPO Maven).  Hence, the degree of underpricing
would again be inversely related to the size of the
issuing firm.
In a 1999 published study, Michael
Willenborg presented a theory that explained de-
mand for IPO shares as a function of several signal-
ing mechanisms which relate to the size and status
of the auditing firm, which in many cases also in-
volves the investment bank (Weiss, 1988).  Specifi-
cally, he used compensation payed to the auditing
firm as proxy for auditing firm reputation.  The two
most prominent effects found in Willenborg’s work
are the informational signaling and insurance sig-
naling effects.   He found that although all compa-
nies benefit from a more reputable (and therefore
more expensive) auditing firm, different sized com-
panies have very different reasons for seeking a pres-
tigious underwriter and auditor.
Willenborg separates issuing firms into two
categories depending on how established a company
is.  If a company hires a more reputable firm, the
signal to the investor is that the company will stand
to benefit from having its financial statements more
accurately analyzed.  Logically, the management
of a firm would only desire this if, in fact, its finan-
cial statements were positive.  Therefore, the better
the auditing firm, the better the perceived health of
a firm’s finances.   This is the informational sig-
naling effect which raises the demand for the IPO.
Also, when a company employs a reputable
auditor, it also benefits from the fact that if the IPO
is overpriced and/or  is involved in securities litiga-
tion, it is more likely that the investor seeking to get
his investment back will be successful if the defen-
dant auditing firm is large and well established.  This
is the insurance signaling effect which also serves
to increase the demand for the IPO.  Willenborg used
previous research to secure the validity of his as-
sumptions that “one might expect that investors
would be willing to pay more for the stock because
of the availability of a potential recovery under the
securities laws” (Alexander, 1994  p.1441).
This theory then assumes that the investment
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Table 1: Regression Model Variables
bank knows about these signaling effects and takes
them into account when agreeing to an IPO con-
tract.  To reduce downside risk, the underwriter will
lower the share price of the IPO.  By doing so, they
decrease the risk of either damaging their reputa-
tion by having an undersubscribed and overpriced
offering or by drawing securities litigation from in-
vestors in a high-risk company.  The uncertainty
about the firm making the issue and their motive to
maintain and improve firm credibility is the cata-
lyst behind the investment bank’s incentive to re-
duce the price of the offering.  The most important
determinants of the uncertainty are the deal size and
the size of this issuing firm.  Therefore, this theory
predicts that as the deal size decreases, the degree
of underpricing will increase.  Since, in most cases,
the deal size is directly related to the size and value
of the issuing firm, this theory fits the trend of the
previously mentioned studies and theories.  It also
implies that as the size and reputation of the invest-
ment bank grows larger, the more likely the invest-
ment bank is to underprice the issue.
IV.  EMPIRICAL MODEL
The vast majority of the theoretical models
discussed in past research have linked the perfor-
mance of an IPO on its first day of trading to signal-
ing factors.  The most prominent factor in the de-
gree of underpricing has been the uncertainty that
exists about the firm making the issue.  The infor-
mation about the firm available to the firm itself,
the investors, and the investment bank is key in de-
ciding the degree of underpricing that the IPO will
receive.  As uncertainty about the firm increases, so
does the amount of underpricing and consequently
the  initial first day gains.  To test for this effect,
variables will be entered into the empirical model
to represent the uncertainty about the firm.  Most of
the past literature has proclaimed both deal size and
issuing firm size as a valid proxy for this.  How-
ever, actually determining the issuing firm size be-
fore an initial public offering can be a problem be-
cause of the question of how a firm should be evalu-
ated.  Most Internet companies have yet to turn a
profit when they make an IPO.  In a market with
even minimal efficiency, deal size should be a valid
proxy for issuing firm size and so only the known
deal size variable will be used.  As the deal size
goes up, the uncertainty involved should go down
along with the degree of underpricing.
To supplement this variable, additional con-
sideration needs to be given to the industry in which
the firm does business.  Because it is hard to decide
on common starting points of most industries,
IPO Underpricing
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dummy variables will be used to segregate the com-
panies by which industry they are in.  The hypoth-
esis here is that industries with a longer, more infor-
mative history will be underpriced less because there
is less uncertainty about the issuing firm.  Two
dummy variables will be used in this equation.  The
first dummy variable, INTERNET, will take a
value of one if a company’s primary business is in
the Internet sector and zero otherwise.  The second
dummy variable, MIDDLE, will take a value of
one if a company is in a newer industry that has
some informative history and zero otherwise.  Ex-
amples of such companies are telecommunications
companies, biotechnology companies, computer and
software manufacturers, and certain pharmaceuti-
cal companies.  A value of zero for both
INTERNET and MIDDLE will represent a com-
pany that is in an industry that has been around for
an extended period of time and should therefore have
the least amount of uncertainty attached to it.  These
companies come from the energy, food and agricul-
ture, manufacturing, and some pharmaceutical sec-
tors.
The next variable will be one to take into
account the dual effect of the motivation of the in-
vestment bank to preserve their reputation.  Since a
more prestigious investment bank raises the demand
for an IPO through informational and insurance sig-
naling, the price will rise, exhibiting a higher de-
gree of underpricing.  Also, because a more repu-
table firm will be more rigorously protecting its repu-
tation and liability, it will tend to underprice issues
as much as possible.  This is because an investment
bank’s reputation can be seriously compromised if
their auditing efforts overprice the offering.  A vari-
able measuring the size of the lead underwriting
investment bank will be added to the equation.  The
size variable will be measured by the market capi-
talization of each bank.   This study will limit the
number of investment banks used in order to give
significant representation to each.  Although the
number of investment banks will be small, the range
of market capitalization values should be sufficient
to investigate its effects on the underpricing of IPOs.
The investment banks included in this study are
Goldman Sachs & Company, J.P. Morgan & Com-
pany, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Donaldson,
Luftkin & Jenret (DLJ), Bear Stearns & Company,
and Hambrecht & Quist.  It is hypothesized that, as
market capitalization increases, initial gains should
also increase.
To account for the effect of original owner
and insider retention of shares found by Leland and
Pyle, the variable Retention will measure the per-
centage of shares owned by insiders. This fraction
is simply the total shares retained by insiders di-
vided by the total shares outstanding.  As the per-
centage retained goes up, by way of a quality signal
to the investors, the demand for the stock should
increase, raising the initial first day gains and there-
fore the degree of underpricing.
The data for this study will come from IPOs
in the 1990s from an array of industries and invest-
ment banks previously mentioned.  Data collection
comes from a variety of web sites where IPO infor-
mation is available (IPO Maven), (Nazdaq.com).
Although there may be some problems with the con-
sistency of the data because it will come from dif-
ferent sources, SEC filings and other measurements
to be looked at are mostly standardized.  Also, be-
cause the required information is not available for
every company, adverse selection may occur, yield-
ing only information about those companies for
which information has been more readily available,
and subsequently have less uncertainty.  The pre-
ceding theories have lead to the variables chosen
which make up the following equation:
% 1st Day Change  = B1 (Retention)  +   B2 (IB)
+   B3 (Deals)   +   B4 (Middle)   +  B5 (Internet)
Also, the predicted signs on the chosen coefficients
are displayed in the Table 1.
 V.  RESULTS
The results of an OLS regression found three
variables to be significant.  These variables were
the dummy variable INTERNET, the size of the
investment bank (IB), and the retention of stock by
insiders.  All had the predicted signs and seem to
duplicate the results found in earlier research.   As
predicted, Internet companies were underpriced
much more than other sectors.  The middle sector,
comprised of fairly new industries like biotech and
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telecommunications companies, did not differ
enough from the older industries (indicated by a zero
value for both MIDDLE and INTERNET variables)
to become significant.   This would lead us to be-
lieve that the brief history that these industries have
had is sufficient to reduce the uncertainty involve
in investing in them.  The coefficient on MIDDLE
was extremely small and it was not significant.  The
only other variable that did not prove to be signifi-
cant was deal size, which displayed an extremely
small coefficient.  The regression was run without
a constant, drawing on the premiss that without any
of the factors being measured here, the degree of
underpricing would be zero.  With 142 observations,
the overall model returned an adjusted R squared
value of .414.  The regression results and coeffi-
cients are displayed in Table 3.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the
three sectors included in this study.  For example,
the 19 Internet companies were underpriced on av-
erage by 109.67%.  Meanwhile, the 55 companies
included in the Middle sector were underpriced by
25.85% on average.  Finally, those companies in
the “Old Sector” were underpriced by 21.64% on
average.
VI.  CONCLUSIONS
Because of the complexity of company
valuations, this study was subject to numerous
sources of error.  The most concerning was distinc-
tion of industries.  Because technology has advanced
so rapidly in recent years, the Internet has been
brought into most industries in some form or an-
other.  Most companies have a web page and many
of them sell products through those pages.  The prob-
lem comes in drawing the line between companies
that merely use the Internet to conduct business, and
companies whose primary business is the Internet.
Although deciding this can be easy for companies
like America Online or EBay, there are a host of
other companies who may be associated with the
Internet enough to make their stocks perform more
like Iinternet stocks although their main line of busi-
ness is manufacturing or retail.
In the future we can only expect the lines
between these companies to blur even more.  How-
ever, as of now, the Internet is still in its infancy and
this study concluded, as others have, that Internet
related companies pose a higher risk factor due to
the youth of the Internet sector.  While many of the
companies in older sectors are valued by a combi-
nation of present earnings and future discounted cash
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flows, many Internet company valuations are based
solely on discounted future earnings, some as far as
twenty or thirty years in the future.  This study
showed that Internet stocks were underpriced much
more than established industries, mainly because
investment banks are more uncertain of the value
of Internet companies and subsequently underprice
them to minimize the downside risk if the stock is
overvalued and the issue is under subscribed.
Although many of the companies included
in the middle sector variable were makers of com-
puters and software, there was still a large differ-
ence between the degree of underpricing they re-
ceived compared with the Internet stocks.  Surpris-
ingly, there was an extremely small difference be-
tween these companies and the old sector compa-
nies including manufacturers of steel and oil com-
panies.  The short history of these companies must
be sufficient for auditors to confidently evaluate the
earnings potential of these firms.
The percentage of the shares retained by the
company insiders also affected the initial first day
gains.  This leads us to believe that investors take
insider retention as a signal of company value, agree-
ing with the previous research and theories by
Leland and Pyle.  Although this study took their
research once step further and included majority
stockholders as “insiders,” the results held true and
the positive coefficient on the retention variable was
very significant.  This result seems very logical and
was completely in line with expectations.  If a
company’s IPO is undervalued, the most likely
people to know this are the company insiders, who
would then hold onto as much of the stock as
possible.
       The variable for deal size was not significant
in this regression model.  It had an extremely small
coefficient and actually had an unexpected sign.  The
results indicate that the deal size had no effect on
the amount of an IPO underpricing.  Perhaps a study
with more investment banks would yield a different
result. In addition, the investment banks used may
cater to a specific deal size range and not alter their
policy on underpricing with different size firms.
While the number of investment banks in
this study was limited, the differences in underpric-
ing used by each bank proved to be significant.  The
degree of underpricing rose with the bank’s size.
This finding is explained by two theories mentioned
earlier.  The insurance and informational signaling
effects of a larger bank theorized by Willenborg
could be driving up the demand for the issuing firms
beyond what would be warranted on the firm’s cre-
dentials alone.  This effect may be happening alone
or in conjunction with the fact that  the investment
banks with large market capitalizations and better
reputations may be underpricing IPOs more because
they have more to lose if they mistakenly overprice
a  stock issue.  These two effects were obviously
stronger than the informational signal from the in-
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vestment bank to the issuing firm. This would dic-
tates that the underpricing would have gone down
as the investment bank size increased due to the fact
that a larger, more prestigious investment bank would
be more likely to conduct a higher quality audit.
 VII.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS
With investment banks as the “gatekeepers”
of the publicly traded markets, it will not be easy
for the system to change without regulatory changes.
Although many think that investment banks carry
too much power, they give investors and issuing
firms the security and liquidity that they need.  For
most firms, making a stock offering as a private
placement without the use of an investment bank is
counterproductive.  The floatation costs involved
in issuing the stock, finding investors, and keeping
up investor relations would make offering stock one
of the most expensive sources of capital.  An invest-
ment bank has the economies of scale to streamline
an initial public offering process in order to lower
the costs enough to make it worth the time and ef-
fort for the issuing firm.
However, with the advent of the Internet,
there is talk of using online auction style bidding in
order to create an equilibrium market price before
a single share is sold.  If this process becomes more
popular, it could eventually alleviate the need for
the floatation services of an investment bank, pro-
viding the liquidity and low costs the firm needs
without leaving any money on the table.  Since the
market price will already be determined by bids
coming in before the stock is released, there cannot
be any underpricing and the signaling effects are
greatly reduced (Barker, 1999).  If a process such
as this could be put to use, the IPO run-up frenzy
will likely disappear from the stock market.  But,
as long as investment banks hold the key to this
market, issuing firms will continue to miss out on
IPO proceeds.
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